




It is widely assumed that the normativity of conceptual judgement poses problems for 
naturalism. Thus John McDowell urges that 'The structure of the space of reasons 
stubbornly resists being appropriated within a naturalism that conceives nature as the 
realm of law' (1994, p 73). Similar sentiments have been expressed by many other 
writers, for example Robert Brandom (1994, p xiii) and Paul Boghossian (1989, p 
548). 
In this paper I want to dispute this widespread view. I am not going to deny that there 
are norms of judgement. My thesis will only be that such norms raise no special 
problems for naturalism. The normativity of judgement can as easily be 
accommodated by naturalists as by anybody else. 
Let me begin by fixing an agreed subject matter. By norms of judgement I mean true 
statements about the way judgements ought to be made . I take it to be uncontentious 
that there are many truths like this.1
However, while I accept that there are many such truths, I do not accept that there is a 
species of normativity peculiar to judgement. My general strategy in this paper will be 
to argue that all norms of judgement are derived from moral or personal values, and 
do not involve any sui generis species of conceptual normativity. 
A central role here will be played by the end of truth. I shall contend that the most 
significant2 norms of judgement can be viewed as prescriptions to the effect that, in 
order to achieve the truth, you ought to judge in such-and-such ways. In my view, 
there is nothing constitutively normative about the end of truth itself. So I take the 
force of these prescriptions to derive from independent moral or personal reasons for 
attaching value to truth. 
Thus truth may in some (or possibly all) contexts have a moral value. Alternatively, 
people may sometimes simply want the truth, for whatever reason. In either case, 
these evaluations will imply truths of the form 'you ought to judge in such-and-such 
ways'. In the former case, these will be derived moral oughts, about how to achieve 
the morally valuable end of truth; in the latter case, they will be derived hypothetical 
imperatives, about how to achieve the personally desired end of truth. 
Of course, both these 'oughts' raise further questions for the naturalist. Most obviously, 
in the moral case the naturalist needs to explain how moral value itself is possible. 
There is also a less obvious difficulty about the second case, namely, to explain the 
status of the 'you ought to Y' that seems to follow from 'you want X' and 'action Y is 
necessary for X'.3
However, neither of these difficulties is peculiar to the context of conceptual thought. 
The issue of moral value arises generally, not just in connection with norms of 
judgement, as does the more subtle problem of understanding hypothetical 'oughts', as 
in 'you ought to tune your car well, if you want it to go fast'. So, if there are problems 
facing the naturalist here, they are not problems occasioned by the special nature of 
conceptual judgement. 
Moreover, both these problems arise for philosophers of all kinds, and not only for 
naturalists. The nature of moral values presents a puzzle to all philosophers, as does 
the problem of understanding the 'oughts' in hypothetical imperatives. So naturalists 
will have no more problems than any other philosophers, if they can reduce the 
normativity of judgement to derived moral or hypothetical prescriptions. 
For both these reasons, I will be content if I can persuade you that norms of 
judgement are derived prescriptions orientated to moral or personal values. I accept 
that there are philosophical problems attached to both these kinds of derived 
prescriptions. But these problems arise across the board, and for all philosophers. 
The plan of this paper is as follows. In the next section I shall explain how my 
approach to the normativity of judgement presupposes a naturalist view of content. In 
sections 3-5 I shall argue that my approach avoids three problems facing alternative 
views. Section 6 elaborates some of these points within the context of specific 
theories of content. Sections 7 then asks whether the linguistic embodiment of 
judgements raises further problems for the naturalist. 
Questions relating to linguistic norms will be postponed to this final section. Until 
then I shall assume that judgements are mental items, and moreover that their 
normativity is independent of any norms of language. This is a matter of expository 
strategy, not of any metaphysical commitment to a realm of pre-linguistic thought . 
As the final section will make clear, I am happy to allow that some judgements are in 
part constituted by norms of language. However, it will be helpful to proceed in stages, 
first showing how naturalism might account for non-linguistic norms of judgement, 
and then adding in the complexities that arise with language. 
2 Norms and the Theory of Content
The approach I have just outlined assumes there is nothing essentially evaluative 
about truth itself. Truth is in the first instance a descriptive property, like car-speed or 
celibacy. Like car-speed or celibacy, it may be personally desired or morally valuable, 
in given contexts, but that is additional to its nature. 
Here I am taking a implicit stand on the analysis of truth-conditional content. In 
particular, I am taking a stand against those approaches to content which place 
normativity inside the analysis of content, in the sense that they presuppose sui 
generis norms governing judgement in explaining truth-conditional content, and hence 
truth4. Let us call theories of this kind 'non-naturalist' theories of content. Neo-
verificationist and Dummettian approaches to content are of this kind, since they take 
content to depend on the conditions in which you are entitled to assert a claim. So also 
are Davidsonian theories of content, which take content to depend inter alia on facts 
about when it is reasonable to form a belief. 
From the point of view of such non-naturalist theories of content, the approach to 
normativity outlined in the last section will seem deficient. For that approach takes 
truth-conditional content and truth as given, prior to any issues of normativity, and 
then analyses norms of judgement as arising only when moral or personal value is 
attached to truth. Non-naturalist theories will regard this approach as necessarily 
ignoring the prior norms which play a role in constituting truth. Instead of explaining 
truth in terms of normativity, non-naturalists will complain, I am trying to explain 
normativity in terms of truth. 
Still, this charge does not worry me, given the availability of a number of accounts of 
truth-conditional content which do not assume normativity in explaining truth-
conditional content. I shall call theories of this kind 'naturalist' theories of content, and 
have in mind here such theories as indicator semantics (Stampe, 1977; Dretske, 1981), 
success semantics (Whyte, 1990, 1991), teleosemantics (Millikan, 1984, 1993; 
Papineau 1984, 1993)5, and Fodor's 'asymmetric dependence' theory of content 
(Fodor, 1987, 1990). All of these theories offer to explain truth-conditional content 
without any commitment to prior norms governing judgement.6
Given that views about normativity interact with general questions about content in 
this way, an obvious dialectical problem faces this paper. It seems that I won't be able 
to say anything useful about normativity without first establishing the right overall 
theory of content. Yet clearly there is no question of adjudicating fully on the right 
theory of content in this relatively short paper. Because of this, my primary thesis will 
perforce be conditional: if you have a naturalist of content, then you can explain 
norms of judgement as derived prescriptions orientated to the end of truth. Still, 
having said this, I do think that the line developed in this paper gives us some 
purchase at least on the larger issue of which approach to the theory of content is 
correct. 
Most obviously, my line directly blocks the argument that naturalist theories of 
content are inadequate because they cannot account for the normativity of judgement. 
From the perspective of this paper, this argument begs the question. I am happy to 
agree that non-naturalist theories of content imply the existence of prior judgemental 
norms that resist appropriation 'within a naturalism that conceives of nature as the 
realm of law', in that non-naturalist theories postulate a peculiar species of content-
constituting norms which appear mysterious from a naturalist perspective. But 
naturalist theories of content don't accept the existence of such special content-
constituting norms, since naturalist theories explain content without any reference to 
such prior norms. They place the norms of judgement outside the theory of content, 
and hold that content and truth are constituted independently of facts of the form 'you 
ought to judge in such-and-such ways'. Given this, they can then account for such 
norms of judgement straightforwardly, holding that all the 'oughts' involved are 
derived oughts, arising when moral or personal value is attached to the independently 
constituted aim of truth.7
So the line defended in this paper directly blocks an argument against naturalist 
theories of content, namely, that they cannot account for the normativity of judgement. 
However, I also feel that it provides some positive support for such theories. This is 
because the naturalist approach dissolves a number of awkward problems about 
normativity facing non-naturalist theories of content. This isn't of course a conclusive 
argument. There may be further overriding considerations in favour of non-naturalist 
theories of content, in which case we will simply need to face up to the problems of 
normativity they generate. But it surely counts against non-naturalist theories of 
content that they generate difficult problems that do not arise for their naturalistic 
rivals. 
In the next three sections I shall identify three such problems. The first relates to the 
universality of the requirement to seek the truth. The second relates to the status of 
norms of judgement. The third relates to animals, children and other unrefined beings. 
In this section I have explained how my naturalist approach to normativity stands 
opposed to non-naturalist theories of content, theories which explain content and truth 
in terms of norms of judgement, and so cannot in turn explain those norms in terms of 
truth. However, my approach to normativity will also be opposed by some 
philosophers who do not embrace such non-naturalist theories of content. I have in 
mind here those epistemologists who defend 'internalism', in the sense of upholding 
normative requirements on knowledge or justification that cannot be explained in 
terms of the pursuit of the external aim of truth. Such philosophers need not suppose 
that these 'internal' norms play any part in constituting content and truth (indeed they 
could embrace one of the naturalist theories of content listed above). But they would 
still deny my claim that the normativity of judgement can be fully explicated in terms 
of the pursuit of truth. 
My main target in this paper is the resistance to naturalism arising from non-natural 
theories of content. In the space available I cannot also seriously address the 
motivations for epistemological internalism, and I shall not refer explicitly to such 
internalist views in what follows. Even so, some of the problems I shall pose seem to 
me to raise difficulties for epistemological internalists as well as for non-naturalists 
about content. In particular, the next two sections seem to me to raise such difficulties, 
even though the third problem, of unrefined beings, does not. 
3 Is There a Universal Requirement to Seek the Truth?
I have contrasted naturalist theories, which place normativity outside the theory of 
content, with non-naturalist theories, which place it inside. In this section I want to 
point to a prima facie reason for thinking that the naturalists are putting normativity in 
the right place. 
Consider people who aim deliberately to mislead themselves. Suppose an elderly man 
realises that he is likely to be upset if he learns about the real probability of his 
developing cancer, and so arranges to avoid any evidence that might undermine his 
sanguine belief that this probability is low. Or suppose an adolescent youth learns that 
people with an inflated view of their own worth are generally happier and more 
successful, and so deliberately seeks out evidence which will make him think overly 
well of himself. Of course, there are familiar psychological difficulties about 
deliberately arranging to have false beliefs, but examples like this suggest they are not 
insuperable8. 
Are these people acting wrongly? Of course, they aren't doing what they need to, if 
they want their beliefs to be true. But by hypothesis they don't want their beliefs to be 
true. So is there any other sense in which they are proceeding improperly? 
It is not obvious to me that there is. I would say that it can sometimes be quite proper, 
as in the above examples, not to be moved by the aim of truth. However, if this is 
right, then there is a problem for those non-naturalist theories of content that explain 
content in terms of normativity, and so place the norms governing judgement inside 
the theory of content. For such theories make it constitutive of your possessing a 
belief with a certain truth condition that you be subject to norms which are apt to 
guide you to the truth.9 In particular, if you believe that you have a low chance of 
cancer, or that you are are blessed with above-average attributes, then the norms 
which constitute these beliefs will apply to you, and so you won't be thinking as you 
ought to, if you have formed those beliefs with due regard to normatively authorised 
evidence. 
Let me be clear about the difficulty I am raising here. The complaint is not that non-
naturalist theories of content suppose an indefeasible requirement to seek the truth at 
all costs. Prescriptions can compete, and there is no reason why the prescriptions 
required by non-naturalist theories of content should not be overridden by other 
considerations, such as the desirability of not upsetting yourself unnecessarily. My 
objection is to the weaker claim, to which non-naturalist theories of content do seem 
to be committed, that there is always some reason to seek the truth, even if it can be 
overridden. For even this weak claim seems to me implausible. Why should we 
suppose that the elderly man, or the adolescent youth, are in any sense obliged to 
comport their beliefs to the evidence? It doesn't seem to me that they are is violating 
any prescriptions at all by adopting their entirely sensible strategies. 
Note how there is no difficulty here if you adopt the naturalist view that all 'oughts' 
relating to judgements are derived oughts, arising because personal or moral value is 
attached to truth. For there is no obvious reason to suppose that derived 'oughts' of 
either these kinds apply to cases like the elderly man or the youth. They don't want the 
truth, and it is not obvious that they are transgressing any moral boundaries in 
avoiding it. The naturalist view thus makes space for the possibility that people who 
aim to avoid the truth may nevertheless be acting entirely properly. 
Perhaps some readers will wonder whether it is as easy as I am suggesting to lack 
personal or moral reasons for seeking the truth. Isn't there always at least some 
personal or moral reason for wanting the truth? I am doubtful about this, but note that, 
even if I am wrong here, this won't really help non-naturalism. For non-naturalists are 
committed to the view that the elderly man and adolescent youth are proceding 
improperly, whether or not there are moral or personal reasons for them to seek the 
truth. After all, non-naturalists believe in sui generis norms of judgement, which 
prescribe the pursuit of truth independently of moral or personal considerations. It is 
this underlying commitment to sui generis norms that I am objecting to, not the idea 
that there may always be reasons of some kind for pursuing the truth. 
Still, even though it is not directly relevant to my line of argument, it will be 
instructive to digress briefly, and consider whether it is indeed possible to lack any 
moral and personal reasons for seeking the truth. On the question of personal reasons, 
it might seem that there is at least one sense in which everybody has a personal reason 
to pursue the truth (even if they themselves suppose, like the elderly man or 
adolescent youth, that they will better off without it). For doesn't it remain the case 
that everybody will be better able to satisfy their desires, whatever they may be, if 
their beliefs are true? Well, I agree that if you act appropriately on true beliefs, then 
your actions are guaranteed to satisfy your desires, and indeed I take this pragmatic 
connection to be a crucial component in the analysis of truth-conditional content 
(Papineau, 1993, ch. 3.6-3.7). And this pragmatic connection does mean that there is 
always a species of derived personal value to truth in beliefs that are relevant to action, 
for such truth will always help you to find a way of satisfying whatever desires you 
have. 
However, this prescription only applies to those beliefs that are relevant to your 
actions, and so provides no reason at all for your wanting truth in beliefs which are 
not so relevant.10 For example, if the elderly man cannot do anything about cancer, 
then his belief about his chance of developing it is unlikely to influence any of his 
actions, and it won't therefore matter to his success in satisfying his desires whether 
this belief is true or not. More generally, while we can agree that everybody has an 
interest in seeking the truth on action-relevant matters, such pragmatic considerations 
do nothing to show that people cannot quite sensibly avoid the truth on other issues. 
So our personal desires need not always give us reason to pursue the truth. What 
about morality? Might it not be that the truth is always to be morally valued? Well, 
while it is uncontentious that the truth is morally valuable in some contexts (it is 
clearly morally valuable that we should have true beliefs about the dangers of 
smoking, for example), it is by no means obvious that it is always morally valuable. 
Does it matter morally. If musicologists are mistaken about the drummer on Elvis's 
first Sun session? Or again, does it matter morally if the elderly man remains hopeful 
that he won't get cancer, or that the youth thinks he is more estimable than he is? 
Of course this issue deserves further discussion. It may well be that reflection on the 
overall role of truth in human life, its importance for social institutions, and so on, 
might show us that we always have a moral duty to respect the truth. Still, as I said 
earlier, even if this is so, it won't really help my non-naturalist opponents. For they are 
committed to truth having a value independently of any such considerations. They put 
the value of truth inside the theory of content, not outside with moral values. And this 
seems wrong. If further reflection were to show us that truth is not always of moral 
value, then in what sense would the elderly man or adolescent youth necessarily be 
acting wrongly in ignoring it? 
4 The Status of Judgemental Norms
I am aware that the points made in the last section will carry little dialectical force 
against non-naturalists. For clear-headed non-naturalists can simply repeat that their 
putative 'oughts' of judgement are special, quite different in kind from moral or 
personal 'oughts'. So, whether or not the elderly man and adolescent youth are not 
doing anything wrong by ordinary moral or personal standards, they will still be 
acting wrongly in a further sense, by violating the sui generis norms of judgement. 
Even so, it has been worth rehearsing these issues, for they serve to highlight the 
peculiar status of the non-naturalists' putative norms of judgement. If these norms are 
quite distinct from moral or personal 'oughts', then where do they come from? What 
kind of fact is it that we categorically 'ought' to reason in certain ways? And whence 
does the guiding force of these 'oughts' derive - why should we reason in these ways? 
I know that I should do what is morally required. And there is an obvious sense in 
which I should do what will get me what I want. But I find myself in difficulty 
understanding why I should be moved by the non-naturalists' putative sui generis 
norms of judgement. 
Thinkers in the non-naturalist tradition have in effect addressed this issue, but it 
cannot be said that they have arrived at any canonical answers. I have in mind here 
the discussion surrounding Wittgenstein's 'rule-following considerations'. This is not 
the place to unravel all the different strands of that discussion, many of which are to 
do with issues of language. But I take it that one central issue which remains, after we 
put issues of language to one side (cf. Boghossian, 1989, p. 514), is the question of 
why we ought to judge so-and-so on specific occasions. Why ought we to judge that 
these things are green? Why ought we to judge that 1,002 is the result of adding 2 to 
1,000? 
When we focus on this issue, non-naturalist theories seem to have little room to 
manoeuvre. It doesn't seem right to explain these 'oughts' in terms of individual 
dispositions. The fact that I am typically disposed to judge that certain things are 
green, say, doesn't make these judgements right, for I may be systematically prone to 
error. Nor does it help to widen the issue to some larger community, for whole 
communities too can be prone to error. In the end there seems to be little alternative 
for the non-naturalist except to hold that the norms of judgement are primitive and not 
to be further explained (McDowell, 1984). This seems unsatisfactory. Even if we can't 
reduce judgemental norms to other kinds of facts, it is surely desirable that we should 
have some kind of understanding of the peculiar force that judgemental norms are 
supposed to exert on us. 
Once more, none of these difficulties about the status of judgemental norms arises on 
the naturalist line I am advocating. On my view, what makes it the case that you ought 
to judge in certain ways on specific occasions is that this will be a means to your 
judging truly. There is nothing circular about this analysis, provided truth itself can be 
analysed without appealing to norms of judgement, and the adoption of truth as an 
aim in turn explained by reference to moral or personal value attached to truth. 
From my perspective, then, difficulties about rule-following are peculiar to non-
natural theories of content. If you want to explain truth-conditional content in terms of 
norms governing judgement, as non-natural theories of content do, then you need to 
explain the source of these norms before you explain content, and it is not obvious 
there is any good way of doing this. But this problem simply does not arise for 
naturalist theories of content. They can explain content without mentioning norms. 
And then, given this, they can happily place norms of judgement outside the theory of 
content, as prescriptions which follow once moral or personal value is placed on truth. 
Some readers may be wondering whether the naturalists' norms can suitably guide
thinkers. We need norms of judgement not just to set a standard, but also to show 
thinkers how to conform to this standard. But bare prescriptions such as 'you should 
judge truly', or even such more specific imperatives as 'you should judge green of 
green objects', 'you should judge n plus 2 when asked to add 2 to n', would seem not 
to fit this bill. They may articulate the aim of judging truly, either generally or on 
more specific matters, but they are not going to help thinkers who need guidance on 
how to achieve this aim. 
This query calls for much detailed analysis, some of which will be sketched in section 
6 below. But at this stage let me merely observe that the adoption of a given end will 
standardly generate derivative norms about appropriate means to that end. Just as the 
adoption of car speed as an end generates the prescription 'you ought to tune your car 
well', so will adoption of truth as an end generate prescriptions about means of 
arriving at truth. The reliabilist tradition in epistemology becomes relevant at this 
point. This tradition is concerned to identify belief-forming methods that generally 
produce true beliefs as output. These are just the kind of methods that you ought to 
use, if value is attached to truth. I would argue that inductive logic, deductive logic, 
standard observational procedures, and many other modes of reasoning are reliable 
methods in this sense. So, by derivatively prescribing these methods as means, the 
naturalist approach to normativity does not just assume truth as an aim, but also 
generates advice about how to achieve it. 
At this point it is worth observing that reliability for truth is not the only desideratum 
that can be placed on belief-forming methods. At least two others offer themselves. It 
will normally also be desirable that our belief-forming methods are important, in the 
sense of delivering informative beliefs on matters of concern, and economical, in the 
sense of not using large amounts of time or other resources. Both these desiderata will 
generally pull against the requirement that belief-forming methods should deliver only 
true conclusions. Moreover, any moral or personal considerations that call for 
reliability are likely also to call for importance and economy, and so that some joint 
optimization of these mutually conflicting desiderata will usually be required. 
For naturalists, then, reliability for truth is simply one potentially valuable feature of 
belief-forming processes, alongside importance, economy, and possibly others. This 
marks a further contrast between the naturalists and their opponents, a further sense in 
which those norms of judgement which relate to the aim of truth are not sui generis 
for naturalists. For naturalists, truth-conducive norms of judgement constitute just one 
dimension among a number of possible ways of evaluating belief-forming methods. 
These norms have no special status which distinguishes them from evaluations 
orientated to further desiderata like importance and economy. This might seem odd to 
philosophers brought up to focus on truth-related issues, but it seems to me just the 
right attitude. There seems no good reason to privilege the desideratum of reliability 
for truth over others when we evaluate methods of belief-formation. True, an 
economical method that generates lots of important falsehoods is not generally worth 
much. But neither is a reliable method that consumes costly resources in generating 
trivialities. 
Having said this, naturalists will do well to concede a significant terminological point 
to their opponents. When we consider whether a belief is 'justified', or constitutes 
'knowledge', we evaluate the methods behind it purely from the perspective of 
reliability for truth, and in abstraction from such issues as importance and economy. 
Imagine a man who spends a month counting the individual blades of grass in his 
garden. We will no doubt feel this is a complete waste of time, and that the conclusion 
is of no possible interest to anyone, yet we will not say on this account that he does 
not know how many blades of grass there are, not that his belief in their number is not 
justified. 
It is striking how these central epistemological notions are exclusively truth-focused 
in this way. I am inclined to think that this tells us something about the central 
importance of truth-seeking for human society (Papineau, forthcoming). Still, we can 
recognize this importance, and the epistemological terminology it carries in train, 
without supposing that there is some special type of normativity attaching to the aim 
of truth. 
5 Unrefined Thinkers
Let me turn now to another respect in which naturalist theories of content fare better 
than non-naturalist ones. On the face of it, many beings who do not observe truth-
conducive norms of judgement nevertheless seem to have contentful beliefs. The most 
obvious examples are higher mammals and very young children, who often act in 
ways that seem to call for the attribution of beliefs, but seem in no obvious sense to be 
observing norms of judgement. This poses a prima facie problem for those non-
naturalist theories which make sensitivity to such norms a procondition of the 
possession of contentful beliefs. 
In addition, some grown-up human beings pose a similar problem for non-naturalist 
theories of content. I am thinking here of the large body of psychological literature 
which suggests that normal humans characteristically violate principles of logic, 
elementary probability theory, and so on (cf. Cherniak, 1986, Stein, 1996). In this 
case it is not just that the believers lack the sophisticated abilities required to observe 
norms. They have the intellectual wherewithal, yet simply fail to apply it to the 
pursuit of truth. If this is right, then again we have a prima facie problem for those 
theories which make sensitivity to truth-conducive norms constitutive of the 
possession of contentful beliefs. 
Once more, non-natural theories of content seem to have little room to manoeuvre. 
Some philosophers, it is true, have argued that the psychological research just alluded 
to should not be taken at face value, and that, when the matter is looked into fully, the 
supposed violations of rational norms can be explained away (Cohen, 1981). I myself 
doubt that anybody without philosophical preconceptions would find this line 
plausible, but, even if it is right, the non-naturalist still has the infants and animals to 
deal with. 
Here the non-naturalist has two options. Either infants and animals are guided by 
norms, or they lack beliefs. Neither option seems attractive. It is hard to see how 
animals and pre-linguistic children could in any sense be said to be observing norms. 
So non-naturalists have tended to go for the other option, suggesting that animals and 
infants do not really have beliefs. ('Dumb animals are natural beings and no more.' 
McDowell, 1994, p. 70.) There seems little to recommend this move. It is one thing to 
recognise that there are significant differences between the beliefs of non-linguistic 
creatures and those of normal adult humans. It is another to inflate this into a 
fundamental division, with genuine thought on one side of the line, and nothing but 
mechanical response on the other. 
Again, note how none of this is a problem for the naturalist. Naturalist theories of 
content regard judgement as prior to norms, and so have plenty of conceptual space 
for beings who have beliefs yet do not observe norms. Of course, specific naturalist 
theories of content will have specific views about the nature of judgement, and it will 
depend on the details exactly whom they recognise as believers. But by definition no 
naturalist theories will make sensitivity to norms itself a requirement for believing. 
(Moreover, for what it is worth, the specific naturalist theory I favour, teleosemantics, 
has no difficulty allowing that animals, infants, and systematically irrational adults all 
have beliefs.) 
From the naturalist point of view, sensitivity to norms of judgement is an addendum 
to the possession of beliefs itself. Such sensitivity can arise in beings with beliefs, but 
does not have to. More specifically, given what I have said so far, it will arise in 
beings who adopt the end of true beliefs, for whatever reason, and consider what steps 
they need to take to achieve this end. 
As it happens, I think adult human beings do this a great deal, and indeed that this 
plays a crucial role in human culture (Papineau, forthcoming). But note that the 
deliberate pursuit of true beliefs involves a sophisticated meta-representational 
concern about beliefs, and is therefore not something that we should expect to be 
present in all beings who have beliefs. Since young infants, and probably all animals, 
lack the notion of true belief, they will be incapable of sensitivity to such norms. And 
even adult human beings, who do have the notion of true belief11, don't always take 
pains to ensure that they are getting their beliefs from reliable sources, and often 
simply take them as they come. 
These points now allow a better understanding of the psychological literature on 
widespread human irrationality. In particular, they suggest a answer to one obvious 
query about this literature, namely, that it seems to be belied by the success of human 
enterprises which call for high levels of doxastic accuracy ('If we're so dumb, how 
come we sent a man to the moon?'). The answer is that humans normally reason badly, 
but can set themselves to do better. We can suppose that humans normally get their 
beliefs from 'quick and dirty' processes, which no doubt worked well enough in our 
evolutionary history, but all too often lead us astray in the modern world, and in 
particular in the experimental circumstances studied by psychologists. On the other 
hand, this is only part of the story. For humans can also deliberately set themselves to 
use reliable methods instead of the 'quick and dirty' tricks. Even if humans don't 
always follow norms that offer reliable routes to the truth, they are perfectly capable 
of this, and characteristically set themselves to do so when it matters. 
According to the naturalist position, then, infant and animal belivers lack the 
intellectual wherewithal to follow truth-conducive norms of judgement, and even 
adult human believers, who are intellectually capable of observing such norms, don't 
always do so. This position may be philosophically unfamiliar, but it has the virtue of 
plausibility. The usual condition, even for adult humans, is surely to think and act 
without worrying about what you are doing. Sometimes, I agree, we adults do make 
an effort to observe truth-conducive norms of judgement, and it is important that we 
be able to do this. But it overintellectualises ordinary mental life to suppose that this 
kind of effort accompanies all judgement. 
6 Some Specific Theories of Content
My remarks so far have contrasted 'naturalist' and 'non-naturalist' theories of content. 
In this section I want to attend to some different species within these broader genera, 
and note briefly how the details affect some of the points made so far. I think these 
refinements are of some intrinsic interest, but they will not affect my overall line of 
argument, so those who have been comfortable with the level of abstraction adopted 
so far may wish to skip to the next section. 
The distinction between natural and non-natural theories of content interacts with that 
between 'output-based' and 'input-based' theories. By 'output-based' I mean those 
theories, like success-semantics and teleosemantics, which analyse the content of 
beliefs in terms of the actions they prompt; and by 'input-based' I mean those theories, 
like verificationism and Dummettian theories, which analyse the content of beliefs in 
terms of the conditions that produce them. In more detail, output-based theories aim 
to equate the truth conditions of beliefs with those conditions that guarantee that 
resulting actions will satisfy desires (with success sematics then differing from 
teleosemantics in its account of desire satisfaction12), while input-based theories aim 
to equate truth (or assertibility) conditions with the circumstances that typically give 
rise to beliefs. 
When I first started thinking about these matters, I saw the conflict as primarily 
between 'output-based' naturalistic theories and 'input-based' non-naturalistic ones. 
This was because the naturalist theories I favour are in fact output-based, while the 
most familiar non-naturalist theories are in fact input-based. However, further 
reflection, showed me that I was running two issues together here. The input versus 
output issue is orthogonal to the natural versus non-natural issue. After all, there are 
also naturalistic input-based theories, like indicator semantics and Fodor's asymmetric 
dependence theory. And, even if there is no clear-cut example of a non-natural output-
based theory, there are elements of this position in Davidsonian approaches to content. 
These distinctions complicate what I have said so far. Take first the division of 
naturalist theories of content into output-based (teleosemantics, success semantics) 
and input-based (indicator semantics, asymmetric dependence). I have suggested that 
naturalist theories of content can regard truth-conducive rules guiding belief-
formation as specifications of means appropriate to the valued end of truth. But this 
comes out somewhat differently for output-based and input-based naturalist theories. 
For output-based theories, all such means will be contingently connected to the end of 
truth: since what makes a belief true are circumstances picked out by the belief's 
relation to action, it will be an independent further fact that any given way of arriving 
at the belief should track the truth. With input-based theories it works differently. 
Since the circumstances that make a belief true will now be equated with some subset 
of the possible causes of that belief, any recommendation that this belief should issue 
only from those causes, while still construable as a derived imperative orientated to 
the valued end of truth, will now be recommending a course that is constitutively
connected with the end of truth. 
Given this, we might expect a related contrast on the output side. That is, we might 
expect output-based naturalist theories to view some aspect of output as constitutively 
related to truth, which input-based natural theories regard as only contingently 
connected. There is indeed such a contrast. To see this, note first how input- and 
output-based naturalist theories are a kind of mirror image of each other. Just as an 
input-based theory needs to distinguish, among all the circumstances which can 
actually cause beliefs, those canonical conditions which constitute their truth 
conditions (this is why Fodor's asymmetric dependence, or something similar, is 
needed), so also does an output-based theory need to distinguish, among all the 
behavioural choices which can actually be occasioned by beliefs, those canonical 
behavioural consequences that play a role in constituting truth conditions: for it is the 
specific circumstances in which those canonical choices lead to successful actions that 
constitute the truth conditions. (The point is that we need to winnow out choices 
occasioned by rushes of blood, acting in haste, and so on, or we will get the truth 
conditions wrong. It is a challenge for a naturalistic output-based theory to make this 
distinction naturalistically, a challenge which I think is best met by teleological 
considerations. Cf. Papineau, 1993, 3.7.7.) 
Now consider the recommendation that people with true beliefs ought to choose in 
those canonical ways, if they are to satisfy their desires, first from the perspective of 
an output-based naturalist theory, and then from the point of view of a input-based 
one. From the output-based perspective, this hypothetical imperative falls 
constitutively out of the nature of truth: if your belief is true, and you so choose, then, 
by the nature of truth, you will satisfy your desires. For, on the output-based theory, 
true beliefs are in effect identified as those which lead to desire satisfaction 
specifically when they combine with such canonical choices. On an input-based 
theory, by contrast, this hypothetical imperative (that you ought to choose in the 
canonical ways, if you are to satisfy desires) will depend on contingent facts. For 
there is nothing in an input-based analysis of content (truth conditions = canonical 
sources) to ensure that if you have true beliefs, and choose in the canonical ways, 
your desires will be satisfied. This may be true, even for an input-based theorist, but if 
so it will be because of contingent facts about the world, and not because of the nature 
of truth. 
Let me now quickly consider these matters from the point of view of non-naturalist 
theories of content. On input-based non-naturalist theories, like verificationism or 
Dummettian theories, recommendations about appropriate sources for beliefs will be 
taken to be primitive norms which fix truth (or assertibility) conditions for those 
beliefs. These theories are thus akin to input-based naturalist theories like Fodor's, in 
fixing truth conditions by reference to appropriate sources, except that they hold that 
there is an essential normativity involved in the reference to 'appropriate'. Moreover, 
they seem to come out exactly like Fodor-style theories on the output side. When it 
comes to recommendations that people with true beliefs ought to choose in such-and-
such canonical ways, if they are to satisfy their desires, an input-based normative 
account offers no constitutive rationale. Just as with Fodor, they can still say that 
these choices are sensible because they will ensure satisfaction of desires, if your 
beliefs are true. But there is no constitutive tie here, and this claim will be true, if it is, 
because of contingent facts about the world. 
What about output-based normative theories? Nobody seems actually to hold such a 
theory, but it is easy enough to imagine one. It would be like success-semantics or 
teleosemantics in fixing truth conditions as those circumstances in which appropriate 
choices will succeed, except in holding, again, that 'appropriate' here is primitively 
normative. So on the input side this theory wouldn't disagree with its output-based 
naturalist counterpart: it would view belief-forming recommendations as derived 
imperatives specifying that certain sources are an effective means, as a matter of 
contingent fact, when value is attached to the end of truth. 
Even if there are no exclusively output-based non-natural theories of content, the 
Davidsonian approach to content can be viewed, as I said, as embodying elements of 
this approach. For we can view Davidson as in effect upholding a non-naturalist 
theory of content which is both output-based and input-based, in that he identifies 
beliefs as states which ought primitively to arise from such-and-such epistemological 
inputs and which ought primitively to lead to such-and-such choices. 
Won't a Janus-faced theory like Davidson's at some point face an embarrassing 
doubling of primitive and derived norms? In its intial identification of beliefs, the 
theory invokes both primitive input and output norms. But there seems no barrier to a 
Davidsonian also recognizing derived norms: derived input norms arising whenever 
moral or personal value is attached to the end of truth, and derived output norms about 
which choices you ought to make, if you are to satisfy your desires. This seems like 
an overabundance of norms. Surely we do not want to allow both primitive and
derived norms prescribing effectively the same strategies for forming beliefs and 
making choices. 
I think this is indeed a genuine problem, but it is not peculiar to Davidson's theory. 
Rather it is a problem that arises for all non-naturalist theories, and indeed is simply a 
special case of the problem I raised in section 3. We can put the point like this. 
Naturalists (whether input- or output-based) want to construe all norms relating to 
beliefs as derived imperatives: input norms are orientated to moral or personal values 
placed on truth, while output norms are orientated to the satisfaction of desires. Non-
naturalists, by contrast, hold that at least some norms (input, or output, or both) are 
prior, sui generis and non-derived, and moreover that these prior norms underpin the 
constitution of content for beliefs. But this means that non-naturalists of any kind are 
going to be threatened with some doubling of norms. For there will be always be 
room for corresponding derived norms, orientated to the value of truth, or to the 
satisfaction of desires, alongside whichever norms non-naturalists take to be primitive 
and content-constituting. (Of course non-naturalists, by definition, will suppose that 
these primitive norms come first, so to speak, in that they are needed to constitute 
truth-conditional content; but the trouble is that, once content has been so constituted, 
non-naturalists won't be able to stop extra derived norms arising, because certain ways 
of reasoning are additionally valued as a means to the end of truth, or because certain 
ways of choosing are additionally valued as a means to the satisfaction of desires.) 
In section 3 I pressed the implausibility of there being primitive norms for truth-
seeking, as required by input-based non-naturalist theories, in addition to derived 
norms which arise when value is attached to truth. We can now see that the point 
generalizes. An output-based non-naturalist theory would have primitive output norms 
(you ought to choose in certain canonical ways) and the hypothetical recommendation 
that you ought to so choose, if you are to satisfy your desires. And a Davidsonian 
Janus-faced theory will have primitive norms for both outputs and inputs, and in 
addition both derived input and output norms. 
I take the general point to argue against non-naturalist theories of any kind, just as the 
special case in section 3 argued against non-naturalist theories with primitive input 
norms. Primitive norms are an embarrassment, given the extent to which derived 
prescriptions are available anyway. 
7 Norms of Language
In this final section I want briefly to consider the lingusitic dimension of judgement. 
Obviously, in the space available, much will have to be taken for granted. Let me cut 
through a number of issues by adopting the following simple two-part model for an 
assertoric language L. (1) Knowledge of truth conditions. For all sentences s in L, 
speakers agree on a claim of the form: s is true if and only if p13. (2) A rule of truth. 
Utterances are governed by the prescription, 'You should utter s only if (you know 
that) p'14. 
Given anything like this model, linguistic judgements will uncontroversially be 
constitued in part by a normative rule of truth. I have argued that content for non-
linguistic judgements is not constituted by norms. By constrast, assertoric utterances 
would clearly not have their contents without a rule of truth. If it were not the rule that 
s is only to be asserted when p, then utterances of s would not have the significance 
they do. (Maybe s would still in some sense be true if and only if p, given its agreed 
truth condition, but it is only in virtue of the rule of truth that we can regard those who 
utter s as committed to p, as offering the judgement that p -- as opposed to 
conjecturing that p, say, or denying that p, or whatever.) 
So I accept that linguistic judgments are in this sense normatively constituted, if 
anything like the simple model above is right. However, I do not accept that there is 
anything in this to trouble naturalism. To start with, note that the issue of normativity 
arises rather differently in the present context from the way it did in earlier sections of 
this paper. In earlier sections I was concerned to explain how naturalists can uphold
claims of the form 'you ought to judge in such-and-such ways'. That is, wanted to 
show how naturalism can accommodate the truth of such normative claims. But there 
is no need for me, as a naturalist theorist, to uphold the norm which I take to 
constitute lingusitic assertions. What matters is that the speakers of the relevant 
language accept the rule of truth for assertions, not that this rule is true. It doesn't 
matter whether they really ought only to say what is true. Their assertoric practice will 
still contain a rule of truth, which will constitute certain utterances as assertions, as 
long as they think they ought only to say what is true. 
In sociological parlance, what matters is that the rule of truth is a social fact in the 
linguistic community in question, not that it is in fact a good rule. As such, it is akin 
to social facts proscribing theft, extra-marital sex, broken promises, driving on the 
right, or splitting infinitives. Such social facts are constituted by the evaluative 
attitudes of the members of the relevant community, quite independently of the 
normative truth. Even if extra-marital sex is in fact quite proper in many 
circumstances, it would still be true that in many societies there is a social norm 
prohibiting it, in the sense that the members of those societies disapprove of it and 
will exert pressure to prevent it. 
Now, there are many interesting philosophical questions about the constitution of 
social facts. For example, there seems reason to distinguish social facts which depend 
on the community's moral attitudes (to sex, theft, promises), from those which rest on 
feelings about etiquette or style (splitting infinitives), and again from those which 
derive from a common interest in coordination (driving on the left). And it is by no 
means clear in which of these three categories the rule of truth ought to be placed. But, 
wherever we put it, there seems nothing to trouble the naturalist. Social facts of all 
kinds are constituted by the psychological attitudes of the members of the relevant 
society. In the earlier sections of this paper I have sought to rebut the most common 
argument for thinking that naturalism cannot accommodate psychological attitudes. If 
I am right, and naturalism can accommodate psychological attitudes, then it should be 
able to accommodate social facts in general, and the rule of truth in particular. 
I have argued that the constitution of languages presupposes only that the relevant 
rule of truth is a social fact, and not that is true. But it is worth observing that, if a rule 
of truth is indeed a social fact, then members of linguistic communities will generally 
have some kind of pro-attitude towards saying only what is true, and this in itself will 
imply hypothetical imperatives about what they ought to do to to get the truths they 
want. Moreover, if it is morally valuable that languages exist, as it arguably is, then 
this in turn will imply that people ought morally to avoid false utterances. 
It is also worth observing that any such prescriptive truths about utterances will also 
generate prescriptions about the avoidance of false belief. If there is moral or personal 
value in speaking truly, then there will be derived moral or personal value in believing 
truly, since aiming to believe truly is a presupposition of aiming to speak truly. In 
preceding sections of this paper I have considered what follows if true beliefs have 
moral or personal value. We now see how the institution of language can add to the 
reasons for which true beliefs might have such value. 
Let me finish by briefly addressing the issue of the relation between thought and 
language. My overall expository strategy may have seemed to commit me to the 
priority of thought over language. After all, I have explained representation, in the 
first instance, by applying naturalist theories of content to beliefs, without attending to 
any involvement beliefs may have in language. And, more specifically, when I have 
turned to language, I may seem to have credited speakers' with language-independent 
abilities to think that p, in explaining their understanding of sentences in terms of 
beliefs of the form sentence s is true iff p. 
However, I don't think there is in fact anything worrisome here. Despite any initial 
appearances to the contrary, I am happy to concede that thought depends on language 
in ways I have yet to address. But I do not accept that this dependence invalidates my 
overall analysis. More specifically, it does not preclude the application of naturalist 
theories of content to beliefs, nor does it preclude the explanation of assertoric 
language in terms of speakers' beliefs about truth conditions. 
It is worth distinguishing two ways in which belief depends on language: 
psychodevelopmentally and constitutively. To start with, linguistic training obviously 
exerts a developmental influence on psychological abilities. Many thoughts are 
clearly too complex for humans whose perceptual sensivities and inferential 
associations have not been shaped by a relevant linguistic upbringing. In addition, 
there is also a more fundamental, constitutive dependence of thought on language. I 
am thinking here of those now familiar cases where my possession of a concept does 
not depend on individual factors like my perceptual sensitivities and inferential 
associations, but rather on the structure of my linguistic community. Names of people 
(Aristotle) or kinds (arthritis) provide obvious examples. Here it is not that my 
linguistic upbringing has caused me to develop new internal states. Rather, my 
possessing such concepts is constituted by my being embedded in a linguistic 
community. If you change the community, while leaving me the same, my concept 
changes. 
I deny that there is anything in either of these kinds of dependence that is inconsistent 
with the overall story I have told in this paper. The first point to address is my use of 
naturalist theories to analyze belief representation. Now, such theories need clearly 
have no difficulty with the fact that linguistic training affects psychological 
sensitivities and abilities. For they can simply embrace these linguistically developed 
abilities as part of what fixes the representational contents of beliefs. Moreover, they 
can make just the same move with respect to the social consititution of content. Again, 
they can simply embrace this, and agree that certain of your states represent such-and-
such, not just because of intrinsic facts about you, but also because of your 
relationships to other people, and in particular because of your embedding within a 
lingusitic community. Of course, exactly how these points might work will depend on 
the specifics of different naturalist theories of content. But it is not hard to see in 
outline how my development of special psychological abilities, or my membership of 
a linguistic community, might affect the informational significance of my states, or 
their teleological purposes, or their success conditions. All in all, there seems no 
obvious reason why naturalist theories of belief content should not simply accept that 
beliefs depend on language in the two ways I have indicated. 
The other point where I might seem to be committed to the priority of thought over 
language is where I assume that assertoric language depends on speakers' beliefs that 
sentences s are true iff p. The worry here is that I apparently need to assume that 
speakers can think p before they learn sentences which mean that p. 
However, I do not in fact need any such assumption of temporal priority. I need only 
claim that once the linguistic institution is up and running, as it were, and speakers are 
capable of thinking that p, then the different parts of the institution, thinking and 
speaking, are coordinated by beliefs of the form: s is true iff p. 
True, this will leave us with an interesting kind of circularity in some cases. Speakers 
have concepts like arthritis because they belong to a linguistic community. This 
community exists in part because speakers follow rules for the linguistic expression of 
these concepts (they aim to assert 'arthritis' sentences only when certain arthritis facts 
obtain). But speakers will only be able to follow these rules if they already have the 
concepts (they won't be able to grasp the rules for 'arthritis' sentences unless they are 
capable of arthritis thoughts). So the concepts are constituted by the rules which are 
constituted by the concepts.15
However, while I accept there is a circle here, I do not think it vicious. It is just a 
special case of certain phenomena (here, mastery of concepts) being constitued by 
rules which in turn presuppose those phenomena. Many familiar social phenomena 
display this feature. There wouldn't be soccer matches unless there were rules about 
who wins soccer matches. There wouldn't be bank balances were there not regulations 
about who has access to bank balances. Certain concepts wouldn't exist were there not 
norms governing the linguistic expression of those concepts. This kind of circularity 
is certainly interesting, but it does not present any more of a special philosphical 
problem than soccer matches or bank balances do. 
Earlier versions (some very early) of this paper were read at the Scottish Postgraduate 
Philosophy Society, King's College London, University of Nottingham, University of 
St Andrew's, and the Cambridge Moral Science Club. Thanks are due to all who 
contributed on these and other occasions, and in particular to Robert Black, John 
Broome, Edward Craig, Peter Goldie, Christopher Hill, Paul Horwich, Alan Millar, 
Gabriel Segal, Scott Sturgeon, Julia Tanney, and Timothy Williamson. 
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1. And by judgements I mean beliefs and their linguistic expression (though until 
section 7 I shall use 'judgement' to refer specifically to beliefs). In this paper I shall 
stand pat on the issue of exactly which mental attitudes qualify as beliefs, and in 
particular on whether moral attitudes do. 
2.At the end of section 5 I shall say something about norms which relate to truth-
independent aspects of judgement. 
3. When I first started working on this paper, I assumed that these hypothetical 
'oughts' at least could be taken for granted by naturalism. More specifically, I assumed 
that there is a sense in which (i) 'A ought to X' is an analytic consequence of (ii) 'A 
wants Y' and (iii) 'X is necessary to Y'. Given that there is nothing naturalistically 
problematic about facts of kinds (ii) and (iii), I therefore took it that there can be 
nothing naturalistically problematic about claims of kind (i): maybe such claims don't 
feature a moral 'ought' (maybe they involve a kind of pun on 'ought'), but even so they 
are analytic consequences of (ii) and (iii). More recently, however, I have been 
persuaded by a paper by John Broome (forthcoming) that this doesn't work. Broome 
shows that there is no special non-moral 'ought' that can be analytically derived from 
(ii) and (iii), because no 'ought' of any kind can be so derived. The only prescription 
in play is 'You ought, if you want Y (and X is a means), to perform X'. The non-
conditional prescription 'You ought to X' cannot be detached. Broome draws an 
analogy. 'Necessarily, if John is married, he has a wife.' We ordinarily then say, 
knowing that John is married, that 'John must have a wife'. But this obviously doesn't 
mean that 'John necessarily has a wife'. It is simply an elliptical statement of the 
necessary conditional. No non-conditional modal claim can be detached. Similarly, 
Broome shows, 'You ought to X' is often elliptical for 'You ought, if you want Y (and 
X is a means), to perform X', and not itself detachable. This thus leaves us with the 
task of explaining the unreduced 'ought' which governs this prescriptive conditional. 
4. Let us agree, against the deflationists (cf. footnote 6 below), that a substantial 
account of truth-conditional content is presupposed by the notion of truth. We can 
also agree that, once we have such a substantial account of truth-conditional content, 
then truth itself falls out without further ado. Thus those who are prepared to reify 
truth conditions can simply say that a judgement is true just in case its truth condition 
obtains. And those who would rather not reify truth conditions, like myself, can note 
instead that a substantial account of truth-conditional content will imply, together with 
further facts, claims of the form 'this judgement is true iff p', for any given judgement, 
and will therewith specify what is required for any given judgement to be true. (Cf. 
Papineau, 1993, pp. 83-6.) 
5. Some readers may be wondering why I have classified teleosemantics as a theory 
that analyses content independently of norms. For many teleosemanticists take the 
view that their theory does indeed trade in norms, in particular 'biological norms', and 
that for this reason teleosemantics offers an immediate solution to the apparent 
conflict between naturalism and normativity (cf. Millikan, 1990; McGinn, 1989). 
However, I find this implausible. Although I myself uphold the teleosemantic theory 
of content, and so regard it as the right source for the sort of naturalist content I need 
for my own approach to normativity, I don't think that the teleosemantics itself says 
anything about norms, nor therefore anything about how to reconcile normativity with 
naturalism. Whatever norms are, I take it that they must involve some kind of 
prescription, some kind of implication about what ought to be done. This simply isn't 
true of the biological facts on which the teleosemantic theory rests. There is nothing 
wrong, I suppose, in talk of 'biological norms', if by this you mean simply that we 
have been designed by natural selection to operate in a certain way. But these 
biological 'norms' aren't norms in any prescriptive sense. It is a vulgar, and indeed 
dangerous, error to infer, from the premise that X has been biologically designed to Y, 
that in some sense X ought to Y. My knuckles have arguably been biologically 
designed to hit people with, but it doesn't in any sense follow that I ought so to use 
them. Again, a number of human male traits have undoubtedly been designed to foster 
sexually predatoriness, but it doesn't follow that men ought to be sexually predatory. 
Similarly with teleosemantics and judgement. As a teleosemanticist I hold that our 
beliefs have been biologically designed to track their truth conditions. But I don't 
think that this does anything to show they ought to do this. 
6. What about 'deflationary theories', by which I mean theories which combine the 
thought that truth falls out of content (cf. footnote 4 above), with the suggestion that 
the device of disquotation (plus the idea of meaning as use) removes any need for a 
substantial account of truth-conditional content? (Cf. Horwich, 1990.) I doubt that 
such theories will work (Papineau, 1993, 84-5), but as far as I can see there is no 
reason why deflationists should not agree with me on all the issues in this paper. After 
all, they don't assume anything in explaining content, so a fortiori don't assume prior 
norms. 
7. To avoid terminological confusion, let me make it clear that this is meant as an 
explanation of how naturalists ought to deal with normativity, not of what they 
actually say about the issue. I don't want to count a writer like Millikan as a non-
naturalist, just because she adopts what I take to be the mistaken view that 
judgemental norms are present inside their theory of content (cf. footnote 5 above). In 
my terminology, then, a theory of content is naturalist if it doesn't in fact commit us to 
presecriptive norms, whatever its proponents may say about this. 
8. Note that these examples involve the manipulation of belief by the deliberate 
avoidance or pursuit of evidence, not any deliberate refusal to tailor your beliefs to the 
evidence you already have. I agree that cases of this latter kind are of doubtful 
psychological possibility. It is intriguing to consider exactly why this should be so. 
9. Here I assume that the non-naturalists' putative content-constituting norms will 
include truth-conducive norms. Some possible non-naturalist theories of content 
might lack this feature, as I shall observe in section 6. But it is common to all actual 
non-naturalist theories, and in particular to theories in the Dummettian and 
Davidsonian traditions. 
10. Note also that the pragmatic connection with successful action is by no means the 
only possible reason for personally wanting truth. You could want the truth for any 
number of reasons, or indeed for none. (In section 7 below I shall explain how the 
institution of language in particular provides one specific reason for wanting true 
beliefs.) 
11. Footnote 4 implies that I am here taking ordinary adults to have a 'substantial 
account of truth-conditional content'. However, this needn't mean a sophisticated 
philosophical theory of content, like a teleosemantic theory, say, or a Davidsonian 
analysis, but only some way of telling which people have which beliefs with which 
contents. 
12. See Whyte, 1991, Papineau, 1993, ch 3.8. In this paper I am ignoring 
philosophical questions about satisfaction conditions for desires. There are non-
naturalist as well as naturalist answers to these questions, as there are for truth 
conditions and beliefs. 
13. Perhaps they need also to know that such claims are derived canonically from 
facts about the semantic roles of s's parts, if this is to constitute knowledge of truth 
conditions. Alternatively, they may derive such claims from claims of the form that s 
means that p, or s expresses the belief that p, or s would be true iff p. I shall skip these 
refinements. 
14. See Williamson (1996) for arguments in favour of inserting the knowledge 
requirement here. 
15. It is specifically the constitutional, not psychodevelopmental, dependence of 
thought on language that generates this interesting circularity. It is scarcely 
noteworthy that a new generation's concepts should causally depend on the linguistic 
practices of older people with those concepts. 
